Creating Asymmetric Advantage

Converging Special Operations Forces, space, cyber, and information operations

U.S. and coalition forces are challenged by increasingly capable adversaries across all domains, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment. The winners of future warfare will be those who imagine and act asymmetrically, innovate and implement the fastest, and converge kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities most effectively. Special Operations Forces (SOF) are uniquely capable of thriving in this complex operating environment. SOF provide deep experience, bespoke capabilities, and unorthodox culture to offer asymmetric options to deter or prevail during competition, crisis, or conflict.

Introduction

“This epoch represents a pivotal moment at USSOCOM – a renaissance of sorts. SOF’s decades-long legacy of problem-solving, courage, relentless determination and incredible outcomes uniquely positions our elite units to tackle 21st-century security challenges.” i

— from "SOF Renaissance 2025" document

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s 2025 Annual Threat Assessment states that “both state and nonstate actors pose multiple immediate threats to the Homeland and U.S. national interests.” ii Actors as diverse as transnational criminal organizations, terrorist groups, or conventional militaries are enabled by widespread proliferation of long-range precision munitions, unmanned systems, advanced conventional weapons, space, cutting-edge cyber capabilities, and effective use of information operations (IO). Easy access to artificial intelligence (AI) will accelerate adversary lethality and effectiveness.

U.S. SOF are among the most agile and effective capabilities in the U.S. arsenal to respond to the range of threats to U.S. national interests across the operational continuum. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and SOF win by creating asymmetric advantage, collaborating and operating with allies and partners, and converging non-kinetic and kinetic capabilities in all domains and the information environment.

Convergence Asymmetry

“Convergence is rapid and continuous integration of capabilities in all domains, the [electromagnetic spectrum], and information environment that optimizes effects to overmatch the enemy through cross-domain synergy and multiple forms of attack all enabled by mission command and disciplined initiative.” iii

— from "The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations, 2028" TRADOC pamphlet

The Fifth SOF Truth states, “Most Special Operations require non-SOF assistance.” With that in mind, LTG John Braga, the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) Commander, conceived the SOF-Space-Cyber Triad. He describes it as the “convergence of transregional, multi-domain, and joint capabilities to exponentially increase the holistic strategic effects of each capability across the spectrum of conflict now and in the future. Our increasingly complex strategic landscape requires innovative approaches that fuse and integrate all our expertise to maximize our collective impact.” iv

Almost five years after the Triad was imagined, the recently published "SOF Renaissance 2025" document reinforces the importance of cyber and space but also spotlights open-source data, information warfare, and the electromagnetic spectrum with the conclusion that SOF will converge all these capabilities to create asymmetric advantage. This is a good time to assess if IO should be added to the framework.

Adversaries understand that the U.S. military’s decisive advantage is not only its weapons and tactics overmatch, but its ability to synchronize kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities globally at mission-relevant speed. Special Operations, space, and cyber forces share responsibility for conducting and supporting kinetic and non-kinetic operations in all domains, operating in contested or denied areas, and conducting or supporting IO.

The SOF-Space-Cyber Triad is intended to converge the capabilities and operations of these forces and capabilities. From gray zone operations short of armed conflict to large-scale contingency operations, each of the forces may conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), direct action, and enable foreign partners. SOF may provide close access for cyber, while cyber forces may provide capabilities for SOF to access non-permissive or denied areas. Space forces could enable SOF and cyber forces with access for intelligence, delivery of cyber or information effects, or special communications capabilities. 

War in the future will remain a human endeavor, and humans at all levels are under the increasing stress of persistent surveillance, increased lethality, rampant misinformation and disinformation, and absorbing an exponential increase in data from countless sources to feed faster decision cycles. This underscores the need to enhance the cognitive abilities of U.S. forces. Achieving a cognitive advantage will require DOD to develop new processes, techniques, and tools.

To sustain overmatch against adversaries, SOF must continuously and rigorously assess threats and innovate to close capability gaps in doctrine, organization, equipping, and training ahead of need. USSOCOM’s rapid acquisition processes enable SOF to become “our competitors’ most unpredictable adversary” v through a rapid convergence innovation lifecycle.

Given the complexity of the operating environment, how does SOF innovate, adapt, and effectively converge the current SOF-Space-Cyber Triad with IO and enhance kinetic capabilities to create asymmetric advantage to defeat any adversary anywhere, any time?

Accelerate and Expand

The Triad has significantly enhanced the convergence of critical capabilities. As we gain a deeper understanding of the importance of converging additional information-related capabilities, open-source data, and electromagnetic spectrum operations (EMSO), it is crucial to evaluate the Triad’s effectiveness. Now is the time to consider whether and how to incorporate IO, transforming the Triad into a "Quad."

To accelerate the convergence of SOF, cyber, space, and IO, SOF should:

Accelerate Transition to a Data-Centric Force

  • Transition SOF to a data-centric organization that leverages data at speed and scale for operational advantage and increased effectiveness. Successfully moving from a data strategy to specific outcomes is crucial for accelerating convergence. Adopting a data-first approach is key to achieving success.
  • Enable cognitive advantage by thoughtful application of AI/machine learning (ML) and training for the operator to address the exponential increase in the velocity, variety, and volume of data on the future battlefield.
  • Focus on applying AI and ML to address critical warfighting challenges. Proactively identify, collect, develop, and secure data sets and AI/ML algorithms required to enable key decisions and support joint targeting.

Transform Warfighting Networks and Infrastructure

  • Treat SOF networks and data as the foundational weapon system for an information-age military. On the future battlefield, fleeting targets and opportunities will give SOF commanders and operators mere minutes or even seconds to make decisions and take action. Latency caused by degraded networks, corrupted data sets, or deficient processes can be the difference between victory or defeat.  
  • Transform SOCOM’s approach to designing, acquiring, operating, and defending the networks and infrastructure that connect SOF to joint force and U.S. partners. Develop robust primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) communications capabilities to ensure data flows for critical warfighting functions in denied, disrupted, intermittent, and limited bandwidth (DDIL) environments.
  • Secure weapon systems and operational technology (OT) across DOD from adversary targeting and kinetic and non-kinetic attack.
  • Rapidly adopt the leading commercial technologies and practices to optimize cloud compute and storage at the edge. Leverage software-defined networking, Kubernetes, 5G, and the extensive nanosatellite capabilities deployed globally to enhance network resiliency and ensure the seamless flow of critical data.

Reimagine Decision Training, Tools, and Processes

  • Reimagine tools and processes to effectively employ AI, ML, and other decision aids for faster and better decisions and outcomes. Addressing data and network challenges alone won’t suffice if SOF lacks the decision aids to reduce cognitive overload.
  • Focus SOF training on realistic cross-domain, cross-service/partner, and cross-functional synchronization and integration of joint/combined capabilities against all-domain-capable adversaries. The adage of “a pint of sweat in training saves a gallon of blood in combat” remains relevant. Education and training with foreign partners are crucial for reducing friction from language and cultural differences.
  • Use the lessons learned from Ukraine, Gaza, Lebanon, and other recent operations to create hyper-realistic live, virtual, and constructive training simulations. These should allow multiple repetitions and the flexibility to change critical variables, such as the loss of critical capabilities due to kinetic or non-kinetic adversary actions. All domains should be represented, including multiple enemy courses of action, faithful models of adversary capabilities, and challenges from culture, language, climate, and geography.
  • Create and converge ranges with emitters, hardware-in-the-loop, and high-fidelity networks with realistic data sources to rehearse IO, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum effects, deception, and actual kinetic and non-kinetic effects. Where possible, train and confirm actual AI and ML models in these simulations.

Expand the SOF-Space-Cyber Triad

  • Assess expanding the current Triad to a Quad by adding IO. This will ensure that information, electronic warfare (EW), and other IO capabilities effectively converge with SOF, space, and cyber to create asymmetric advantage across the continuum of operations in a volatile world.
  • Resource SOF, space, cyber, and IO forces to effectively operate together—and with the joint force as a whole—using common tools, data, and technology.
  • Develop policies and operational use cases for employing the full range of capabilities inherent to SOF, space, cyber, and IO. These capabilities can access denied areas through other domains to conduct intelligence, influence, and effects operations.
  • Develop and resource special technologies and training capabilities such as digital ranges, hyper-realistic simulations, and covert communications. These are essential for training and developing an operational force capable of conducting multidomain operations utilizing unique SOF/space/cyber/IO capabilities. Train these forces to operate in both integrated and independent scenarios across the spectrum of permissive/non-permissive and contested/non-contested environments.

Last Thoughts

“The future of SOF is now. Our [p]eople will continue to be the tip of the spear, creating dilemmas for adversaries, options for the Joint Force, reassuring [a]llies, and responding to crises with unmatched speed and precision to [w]in.” vi

— from "SOF Renaissance 2025" document

On the future battlefield, achieving effective “convergence” of non-kinetic and kinetic capabilities across all domains faster and more effectively than any adversary will be the single most important capability and asymmetric advantage for the joint and combined force.

SOF will play a leading role in creating convergence to enable all defense activities across the operational continuum. Updating the current SOF-Space-Cyber Triad to include IO provides a wide range of capabilities to create asymmetric advantage for the joint and combined force while simultaneously denying adversaries the same advantage.

Despite its changing character, war remains a human endeavor. Humans at all levels are under increasing stress from persistent surveillance, increased weapons lethality, misinformation/disinformation, and the need to process an exponential increase in the volume, variety, and velocity of data, driving faster decision cycles. This underscores the need to enhance the cognitive abilities of SOF. Achieving cognitive advantage requires developing new processes, techniques, tactics, tools, and capabilities.

If deterrence fails, winning the first fight matters. USSOCOM should accelerate the necessary changes to organizations, culture, processes, and capabilities that ensure the joint force wins decisively on the future battlefield against any adversary—anywhere.

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Endnotes

i USSOCOM, 2025, SOF Renaissance, United States Special Operations Command, pg. 21. (Accessed on 5 May 2025 https://www.socom.mil/Documents/2025-SOF_Renaissance(25FEB)Web.pdf)

ii Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2025 Annual Threat Assessment, pg. 4. (Accessed on 5 May 2025 https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-publications/reports-publications-2025/4058-2025-annual-threat-assessment)

iii U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028, Executive Summary, pg. vii. (Accessed on 5 May 2025 https://api.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/2021/02/26/b45372c1/20181206-tp525-3-1-the-us-army-in-mdo-2028-final.pdf)

iv Jonathan Braga. “Statement of Lieutenant General Jonathan Braga Commanding General United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) Before the Senate Armed Services Committee Emerging Threats and Capabilities Sub-Committee.” 27 April 2022. pgs. 1-2. (Accessed on 5 May 2025 https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2022%20USASOC%20Posture%20-%20LTG%20Braga%20-%20SASC-ETC%20(27%20April)%20(Final).pdf)

v USSOCOM, 2025, SOF Renaissance, United States Special Operations Command, pg. 18. (Accessed on 5 May 2025 https://www.socom.mil/Documents/2025-SOF_Renaissance(25FEB)Web.pdf)

vi USSOCOM, 2025, SOF Renaissance, United States Special Operations Command, pg. 21. (Accessed on 5 May 2025 https://www.socom.mil/Documents/2025-SOF_Renaissance(25FEB)Web.pdf)

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