The Military Space Program - A Brief History

September 21, 2007 — Speech given by Thomas S. Moorman, Jr. (Booz Allen Vice President) at the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronomy (AIAA) Space 2007 Conference and Exposition held in Long Beach, California.

Thank you General Hamel for that introduction and good morning everybody.  I’m pleased to be here and to be part of this morning’s panel.  I want to commend Bob Dickman and the AIAA for yet another terrific Space Conference.

As General Hamel mentioned, my job this morning is to provide a retrospective look at the past fifty years of military space and to present some future challenges as grist for our panel discussion.

Spending some time reflecting on our past is wholly appropriate for a variety of reasons. First, as this audience knows well, 2007 is the fiftieth anniversary of Sputnik and the dawn of the Space Age.  Secondly, understanding where we’ve been is useful as we think about the future.  In that light, I think the philosopher; George Santayana had it right when he said, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”

Lastly, although the history of military space is relatively short; nevertheless, it has been a period of extraordinary accomplishments. As such, we should be mindful and proud of our history and celebrate those accomplishments.

This morning I will divide my presentation into five sections which are roughly in chronological order:

• The Early Years
• Creating the Force Structure
• Getting Organized
• Space Support to Contingency
• Conflict and Future Challenges

Obviously, I will only be able to scratch the surface on these subjects.  Despite that disclaimer, I will try to highlight certain events that have special relevance today and for the future.

The Early Days

It is conventional wisdom to begin any discussion of military space with the Sputnik launch.  However, I think it is important to note that there had been numerous studies dating back to 1946 which examined the feasibility of performing military missions from space to include reconnaissance, communications and weather.  Moreover, in the fifties prior to Sputnik, each service had established substantial and highly capable organizations to deal with space—the US Army Ballistic Missile Agency in Huntsville, Alabama, under the leadership of Wernher Von Braun and General John Medaris; the Navy at the Naval Research Lab and the Applied Physics Lab at John Hopkins; and the Air Force at the Western Development Division just north of here in Inglewood, California. Over time and for a variety of reasons—not the least of which was Gen Schriever’s and his team’s work on the ICBM [Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile] program—the Air Force became the space service.

The launch of Sputnik was, of course, a shock to our national psyche and created a crisis atmosphere throughout the country.  The US answer was the Explorer I launch in January 1958 and the Cold War space race was on.  On the policy and organizational front, President Eisenhower signed into law the National Space Act in July 1958.  The Space Act created NASA and split US space activities—civilian space would be a NASA responsibility while military space would be handled by the Defense Department.  The third space sector was created when a covert organization, the National Reconnaissance Office, was established in January 1961—which incidentally was just five months after the first successful Corona launch which revolutionized imagery collection.  While support agreements between these sectors were developed over time, the sectors, by policy and practice, were independent of each other.

I think it is also interesting to note that President Eisenhower established the precedent of White House interest and involvement in matters of space policy.  This involvement is underscored by the fact that every President from Dwight D. Eisenhower to George W. Bush has published his administrations’ space policy.  Moreover, the broad policy tenets have, by and large, been consistent, and, in the case of military space policy, fairly permissive.  For example, by policy, the US has always asserted the right to take any actions necessary to defend space capabilities and interests as well as deny an adversary’s use of space that threaten our interests.

Creating the Force Structure

With that as background, the 1960s and early 1970s saw the rapid growth of military space technologies, infrastructure and programs. The breadth of space capabilities developed during this time was indeed quite remarkable and in a word—breathtaking.  In a little over a decade, the US went from reeling from the Sputnik launch to a full service space power with a range of satellites for communications, weather, warning, navigation and reconnaissance. These satellites were supported by an  extensive and highly capable infrastructure for launch and satellite control. Additionally, the military operated both a ground based space surveillance system to keep track of all the objects in space and an anti-satellite system.

Most everyone is familiar with the satellites, infrastructure and our spacetrack capabilities.  What you may not know is that given the Soviet threat, developing an anti-satellite system was a high priority during the Cold War regardless of administration.  The first program, SAINT, was a satellite interceptor—it was cancelled for political reasons and capability limitations.  Program 437—a nuclear tipped THOR system—was deployed to Johnson Island in the Pacific and was operational from 1964 to 1975.

When the Soviets resumed testing of their co-orbital ASAT [Anti-Satellite] system in early 1976, the US had no comparable system having decommissioned Program 437 a year earlier.  The Soviet action raised serious concerns about our satellite vulnerability and survivability.  President Ford’s response was the National Security Decision Memorandum 333 which resulted in the initiation of a new ASAT program—the F-15 Miniature Homing Vehicle, a renewed emphasis on space surveillance and survivability through new technologies.  The F-15 MHV was ultimately launched against a non-operational US satellite and successfully destroyed its target on Friday 13 Sept 1985—the program’s only test against a satellite. Because of congressional restrictions on testing and budget constraints, the Air Force cancelled the program in 1988.

Getting Organized

The decade of the eighties can justifiably be called the space organization decade.

For a number of reasons including—the Soviet space threat; our increased dependence on space systems; the corresponding growth in the military space budget and a perceived need to change the orientation of space capabilities from technology push to operational pull—the Air Force created Air Force Space Command on Sept 1982.  Coincidentally, the Command has just celebrated its twenty fifth anniversary.

A year later, the Naval Space Command was stood up at Dahlgren, Virginia.  While the Air Force and Naval commands were responsible for organizing, training and equipping, there was a need for a combatant command for space.  As such, the United States Space Command was created in 1985.  Three years later, the Army Space Command was established. 

US Space Command was disestablished in 2002 and its responsibilities transferred to US STRATCOM [Strategic Command].  As for the service space commands, they have continued to evolve with new missions.  For example, the Army has combined space and missile defense into a single command.  Naval Space Command has been transformed and is now part of Naval Network Warfare Command.  The Air Force Space Command has added the ICBM mission and space and missile acquisition (SMC).

The mention of SMC’s realignment under Air Force Space Command reminds me to mention that space organization and management has been a consistent topic of interest not only within the DoD [Department of Defense] but outside of the Executive Department as well.  In 2000, the Congress directed that a Space Commission be established to examine the organization and management of space activities that support national security interest.  This Commission, under the then former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, made a host of far reaching recommendations.  Congress continues to be interested in how the military space sector is managed and accordingly has directed another space organizational review in the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008.

Space Support to Contingency and Conflict

Over the years, our warfighters have become increasingly dependent upon data from space.  To my knowledge, the first tactical use of space occurred during Vietnam.  In the early days of the air war, we were doing weather reconnaissance solely with airplanes—just like we did in World War II.  When the heretofore classified weather satellite system (DMSP) was introduced in 1966, it provided a synoptic view of the entire Indo-China peninsula and accordingly, greatly improved the effectiveness of air operations against targets in Vietnam and Laos.  The DSCS II communications satellites were also used in Southeast Asia to transmit imagery, but because of bandwidth limitations, it was a slow process to send just a frame of post strike imagery.

The employment of and dependency on space gradually increased throughout the eighties.  For example, space systems supported Urgent Fury—the 1983 invasion of Grenada; Eldorado Canyon—the 1986 bombing of Libya; Earnest Will—the 1988 Persian Gulf minesweeping operation and Just Cause—the 1989 operation in Panama.

With each of these operations, our experience in the tactical application of space systems increased.  All of this experience would be put to good use in support of Desert Shield/Desert Storm.  As you may recall, Desert Shield was the six month build up period that preceded Desert Storm.  During that time, the Iraqis test launched three Scud missiles.  These launches were also a very real test of our capabilities.  The missile warning satellite system, DSP, saw each launch and with each launch, our space operations crews were able to develop and refine quick response procedures that would be crucial during the ensuing conflict.

Another example of pre-hostility space activity involved the demand for GPS receivers.  I know it sounds inconceivable now, given that most Americans think of GPS as a utility, but in late 1990, the Army had only bought 1000 military GPS [Global Positioning System] receivers.  As the demand for GPS services increased in theater, the GPS Program Office purchased 13,000 civilian GPS receivers for use in military vehicles.  GPS, of course, would be invaluable once the conflict started. 

The bottom line of these two examples is that the Desert Shield period was critical in enhancing our space operations readiness.  Without the preparation time, it is unlikely that space systems would have been as effectively employed as they ultimately were in the course of the conflict. 

Desert Storm has been dubbed “the first space war.”  In some respects, that description could be literally a misnomer as the conflict was not in space. Rather, Desert Storm was the first time that the full complement of national security space systems were brought to bear on a conflict.  The phrase also underscores that in Desert Storm, space was integrated into combat operations to an unprecedented degree and data from space became indispensable to the warfighter.

 The story of space support to Desert Storm has been often told;  so I will only provide a few brief examples.

• Communications satellites provided about 80% of the long haul satellite communications plus much of the intra-theater communications.
  
  
• DSP saw all the Scud launches and provided sufficient  warning for troops in the field as well as civilians to take cover and to don gas masks.  DSP data also was passed to Army Patriot batteries and to F-15s flying Scud patrols.
  
  
• The DMSP weather satellites played a critical role as the air war was conducted during the worst weather in over a decade.  In addition, one of the DMSP sensors measured moisture content of the terrain.  This data was critical for the ground forces especially the armored force.
  
  
• GPS may have been the space success story of the war.  At the initiation of conflict, GPS equipped aircraft guided Apache helicopters to their successful strike on Iraqi early warning radars.  Later, it could be argued that GPS was one of the factors which enabled the  “left hook” invasion across the featureless desert of Western Iraq.

So, Desert Storm was a watershed event for space.  A whole generation of warriors now realized the value of space in modern warfare.  Given this new understanding, warfighters wanted more responsiveness out of current systems and understandably wanted a greater voice in the development of requirements for new systems.

Within the past decade, the United States has been heavily involved in three major combat operations.  Operation Allied Force in 1999 was an air campaign against the Serbs.  The next two—Operation Enduring Freedom against the Taliban in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq were part of President’s Global War on Terrorism.  In the interest of time, I won’t go into detail on space contributions to those conflicts.  Suffice to say, the evolution and maturation of space capabilities and the associated integration of space as part of the joint fight continued at an ever accelerating pace.

Perhaps some selected trend data will underscore this progress.  From Operations Allied Force to Enduring Freedom to Iraqi Freedom, the number of US and coalition satellites supporting these operations doubled (50 to 100).  The amount of bandwidth required increased dramatically and the percentage of GPS precision guided missiles  also doubled.  Satellites also enabled and supported “reachback” capabilities for an ever increasing inventory of UAVs [Unmanned Air Vehicles].  Moreover, the space organization and C²  within the Combined Air Operations Center and supporting commands significantly improved over the course of these operations.  Two of these improvements were the designation of the theater’s Joint Force Air Component Commander as the Space Coordinating Authority and the establishment of a Director of Space Forces.

Future Challenges

With that rapid and selective review of 50 years of military space history as background, let me now turn to identifying some challenges going forward.  Perhaps, these challenges can form a backdrop for some of the panel’s discussions.  Obviously there almost an infinite number of issues confronting military space. In the interest of time, I’ve chosen four.

Responding to the Space Threat—When I first read about the Chinese ASAT test last January, it gave me a sense of deja-vu.  Although the country and capabilities are different, it reminded me of the mid 70s when the Soviets resumed their ASAT testing.  As I mentioned earlier, the Soviet resumption of testing stimulated renewed interest in the vulnerability and survivability of the US systems.  Hopefully, the Chinese test will have a similar effect in galvanizing us to action.

On the programmatic side, I think the challenge is to identify a coherent strategic plan with prioritized investments.  My personal bias is the highest priority need is space situational awareness. In addition to planning and programs, I think it is important to encourage a debate on space power to include development of a space deterrent theory. I personally think we need something similar to the intellectual ferment that surrounded nuclear deterrence.  Frankly, it has been a long time since we have seriously addressed space as an arena of conflict on a national level.

The Growing Interdependence of the National Space Sectors—Earlier I said, that initially our national space sectors (military, intelligence, civil and commercial) were, by policy and practice, independent and stovepiped. Over the past two decades, these sectors have converged such that they are now increasingly interdependent.  In fact, if one were to chart the Nation’s space activities, there would be very few that are done solely by one space sector e.g. SIGINT [Signals Intelligence] collection and interplanetary exploration. In fact, quite the opposite is true.  Most functions—like launch, satellite C², remote sensing and communications—are done by all the sectors.  Many would argue that because of enabling technologies, budget constraints and operational imperatives, the trend toward greater interdependence and information sharing will only increase in the future.  I believe this trend is not only inevitable, but also desirable and hence, leadership needs to be out in front in accelerating the process.

I know that there are a number of examples of this growing interdependence.  One which come to mind is the increasing cooperation between the Air Force/Joint Space Component and the NRO.  Perhaps the panel could offer their views on this specific subject and the general interdependence topic as well.

Achieving More Responsive Space Systems—An enduring theme is the quest for more responsive space systems.  Today, one of the major initiatives dealing with this need is Operationally Responsive Space – ORS.  While there was a panel yesterday on this subject; nevertheless, I want to tee it up for this panel as well.

I am a supporter of ORS in that we must be more efficient in acquiring and fielding space systems.  We also must be more effective in getting space-derived data and products to warfighters and decision makers.  Having said that I offer the following comments from a guy who grew up as a “big space guy”.

• To be successful, ORS needs to be operationally relevant—that is to fill  a need and be supported by a CONOP [Concept of Operations]. Gap fillers and reconstitution seem like a couple of logical approaches.
  
  
• It needs to be inclusive, that is we should avoid a situation that pits extant space builders, launchers, operators and analysts against the folks with a new idea.  It should also be a mindset that permeates throughout the life cycle of space systems from technology to development to launch to ground processing to analysis.
  
  
• It must be sustainable.  This is the attribute that is most often forgotten in technology driven programs.  Sustainability must be a consideration in the design and operations of an ORS solution.   To me, what that means is that existing space acquisition and operational organizations have to be deeply involved from the outset.

I will resist the temptation to be more expansive in favor of soliciting the panel’s view of ORS status and the way ahead for the program.

Continuing To Improve the Acquisition of Space Systems—Let me conclude with some comments on the continuing challenge of space acquisition. This is a topic which is certainly not new; but nevertheless is exceedingly important, as the space acquisition community has suffered a crisis of confidence over the past 10 years or so.  Large overruns and Nunn-McCurdy breaches spawned a view “space is broken” and, as a consequence credibility has eroded.  From my knothole, I think we are turning the corner on this problem by emphasizing basic blocking and tackling skills and placing a priority on technology maturation, systems engineering, mission assurance and program control.  However, getting well in acquisition is still a journey.  Perhaps the longest pole in the tent is rebuilding the acquisition workforce in both government and industry.  This is a generational problem which will take leadership commitment and a concerted and sustained effort.
 
Our panel has a lot of experience in the business.  I think the audience would be interested in your views— are we turning the  corner and what are your perspectives on the workforce issue?

Well I am certainly out of time.  Let me wrap this up by applauding the government, industry and academia partnership which has brought this country such magnificent space capabilities.  You all should be justifiably proud of your heritage and your achievements.  I also want to acknowledge the superb service that the AIAA provides to the nation and our aerospace community.  Your role in increasing public awareness and in sponsoring events to exchange ideas is deeply appreciated.

Thank you for your attention and patience.